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Abstract 
Transport Certification Australia Limited, jointly with the National Transport Commission, 
has undertaken a project to investigate the feasibility of on-board mass monitoring (OBM) 
devices for regulatory purposes.  OBM increases jurisdictional confidence in operational 
heavy vehicle compliance.  This paper covers technical issues regarding potential use of 
dynamic data from OBM systems to indicate that tampering has occurred.  Tamper-evidence 
and accuracy of current OBM systems needed to be determined before any regulatory schemes 
were put in place for its use.  Tests were performed to determine potential for, and ease of, 
tampering.  An algorithm was developed to detect tamper events.  Its results are detailed. 
Keywords:  Heavy Vehicle, Dynamic Signal, On-board Mass Monitoring, Tamper, Vehicle 
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Telematics. 
1. Introduction 
Transport Certification Australia Limited (TCA) was created to administer the Intelligent 
Access Program (IAP) and certify HV telematics service-providers who provide IAP Services.  
Stage 1 of the IAP monitors HV location, time, speed, tamper-evidence and proprietary trailer 
identification (Karl et al. 2009).  TCA, jointly with the National Transport Commission 
(NTC), has undertaken a project to investigate the feasibility of on-board mass (OBM) 
monitoring devices to be incorporated into Stage 2 of the IAP (Davis et al. 2008a).  OBM 
increases jurisdictional confidence in operational HV compliance.  This paper covers technical 
issues regarding potential use of dynamic data from OBM systems using air pressure 
transducer signals to indicate that tampering has occurred.  The use of load cell data for a 
similar purpose has yet to be determined (Karl et al. 2009). 
 
Tamper-evidence and accuracy of current OBM systems needed to be determined before any 
regulatory schemes were put in place for its use.  There are no regulatory OBM schemes for 
HVs operating anywhere in the world.  Australia, via the IAP (Davis et al. 2008a; Karl 2007; 
Karl et al. 2009; Transport Certification Australia 2005) is examining the feasibility of such 
implementation. 
 
Tests were performed to determine potential for, and ease of, tampering.  Various tamper tests 
were performed; the one that concerns this paper directly was where the air lines to the OBM 
primary transducers were closed off.  Dynamic data were recorded for open and closed 
primary transducer air line states.  The two sets of data were compared and an algorithm 
developed to detect the differences. 
1.1 Test methodology 
The testing program was conducted in line with Davis et al. (2008a; 2008b).  Twelve test and 
control OBM systems from eight suppliers were installed on eleven HVs.  The details, 
differences and brands of the OBM systems have been made anonymous here and in other 
work (Karl et al. 2009) due to the competitive nature of the OBM industry in Australia.  
Where APTs were part of the OBM tested, these converted air spring pressure into electrical 
signals proportional to that pressure.  The OBM systems using these primary transducers 
processed those signals into a reading to indicate the mass of the HV axle group.  Some APT-
type OBM systems used an algorithm to compute the steer axle mass where that axle did not 
have a primary transducer for direct measurement.  This was done by computing the steer axle 
mass from the moment of the HV chassis from a reading on the drive group air springs. 
 
The HVs were weighed a number of times on weighbridges after a short road circuit as part of 
the broader test programme (Karl et al. 2009).  The suspensions of the tested HVs were 
exercised between readings to ensure that bushing hysteresis, inter-leaf friction, air bag 
stretch, etc, were averaged out over the readings.  That meant that each test HV was required 
to perform some travel activity before returning to be weighed again, typically a circuit around 
a suburban block or within a transport depot.  This provided an opportunity to record APT 
data (where these were fitted) during these circuits.  Examples of the tested HVs are shown 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 – Montage of test HVs and dates of testing. 
1.2 Sampling frequency 
It was postulated that dynamic data could inform the development of a tamper indicator.  
Further to this, it was theorised that signal frequencies of the pressure in the air springs, and 
influenced by axle-hop, would be key to this development.  HV axle-hop occurs at frequencies 
approximately 10 to 15 Hz (Cebon 1999).  For the Nyquist sampling criterion (Shannon’s 
theorem) to be satisfied, data capture needed to be at least twice the frequency of interest 
(Houpis and Lamont 1985) or at least 30 Hz. 
 
Most commercial OBM systems do not record dynamic data at frequencies that would have 
allowed axle-hop to be recorded but most manufacturers have stated that their systems would 
be capable of such measurement, were it required (Davis 2008).  Data were recorded during 
the road circuits.  This was with a HV OBM system whose manufacturer had specified a 
sample interval of 24.0 ms, providing a sampling rate of 41.6 Hz (Davis et al. 2008a; Davis et 
al. 2008b).  Accordingly, the Nyquist sampling criterion (Shannon’s theorem) was met 
(Houpis and Lamont 1985) for that part of the data gathering during the tests. 
2. Tamper tests - detail 
Controlled tampering during the tests was carried out to determine whether the effects of that 
tampering could be detected from changes in the data.  Accordingly, some basic tampering 
that involved changing the operation of the test vehicle or its systems occurred.  Some tested 
OBM systems used APTs to determine OBM mass readings from air spring pressure.  For 
those cases, a ball valve or turncock was interposed in the air line between the APT and its 
associated air springs (Figure 2).  This allowed the pressure in the air springs of the axle group 
being measured (to determine the mass on that group) to be presented to the APT or not.  
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Accordingly, this simulated the case where an operator may block the APT air line in an 
attempt to provide an OBM system with a false, and lower, group mass than the actual mass 
(Davis et al. 2008a; Davis et al. 2008b). 
 
 
Figure 2 – Ball value interposed between air spring and APT. 
3. Results – analysis of dynamic data for non-tamper events 
The data sets recorded during the exercising of the HV suspensions is exemplified by the time 
series in Figure 3.  These data sets were recorded, for each test HV for each circuit for each 
load point, from the air pressure transducers connected to the air springs.  Such plots were in 
alignment with typical HV air spring time series data recorded during travel over typical 
uneven pavements for other testing programmes (Davis and Bunker 2008). 
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Figure 3 – Example of dynamic on-board mass data. 
 
The dynamic air pressure transducer (APT) data were analysed using a fast Fourier transform 
(FFT).  The frequency spectra at the air springs for all axle groups for all circuits (Davis et al. 
2009) were derived.  Rectangular FFT windowing was used (Brigham 1988) to analyse the 
1248 data points recorded at 41.6 Hz for each dynamic recording as described above.  
Examples of these FFT plots are shown in Figure 4.  The vertical scale used is an arbitrary 
linear scale. 
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Figure 4 – Example of FFTs results from dynamic on-board mass data. 
 
The FFTs in Figure 4, and others derived from the data recorded for this project, indicated 
that, for healthy suspensions without tampering, the frequency spectra of the air springs had 
various peaks from 1.0 Hz to 15 Hz.  Further, the frequency peaks shown were a combination 
of vehicle Eigenfrequencies, vehicle geometry, and road surface unevenness.  Vehicle 
Eigenfrequencies are related to vehicle dynamics and include such phenomena as body 
bounce, body pitch and axle hop.  Body bounce is usually in the approximate range of 1 to 4 
Hz (de Pont 1997).  The pitch mode frequency is usually in the 3 to 4 Hz range (Cole and 
Cebon 1991; OECD 1998).  The axle hop frequency is usually in the 10 to 15 Hz range 
(Cebon 1999). 
 
Other influences that would be manifest in a FFT of air spring data would be where frequency 
matching between the vehicle Eigenfrequency and the road profile wavelength occurs for a 
given vehicle speed (OECD 1998).  Peaks in the FFT plots shown in Figure 4 correspond to 
these types of influences.  It is not necessary to identify the origin of each peak in the FFT plot 
in detail any further.  This is because the development of the tamper indicators later in this 
paper is based on the amplitude of the FFT being uneven, comprising peaks and troughs, 
across the frequency range. 
4. Development of tamper metrics 
Heavy vehicle (HV) regulators regard tampering with vehicle instrumentation or measurement 
systems, particularly those on HVs, as a major issue. 
 
The ball valves were closed to simulate tamper events deliberately designed to prevent 
detection of correct HV mass while the test HV performed a circuit on typically uneven 
pavements.  Examples of dynamic data recorded for test cases of tampering with the ball 
valves to the APTs shut are shown in Figure 5.  The choice of left or right side, drive or trailer 
axle data in these figures was not particularly significant; they are presented here as 
illustrative of typical dynamic data recorded during the tamper testing for all circuits and 
tested HVs. 
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Figure 5 – Examples of time-series data from on-board mass system when tampering 
occurred. 
The plots of the air spring data in Figure 5 indicate that the signal is relatively steady, 
sometimes declining due to air line leaks and with some small variation due to electronic 
noise present.  They differ markedly from the dynamic data that would be expected from air 
springs in the time domain such as shown in the time series in Figure 3. 
 
The right panel of Figure 5 shows two signals from the drive axle of a test HV where both air 
lines were leaking.  A decline in pressure is apparent approximately 5 seconds after the 
recording started and before the HV started its test run.  Note that the ball valves were turned 
off at different times for this plot, leading to different starting points for air pressure depletion.  
Not all air lines in HVs leak; some do and that is a normal condition that is compensated for 
by the supply of more air from the compressor on the HV.  The examples shown were 
representative and typical of the results from the tamper events where the air lines to the APTs 
were blocked.  Accordingly, both the leaky and the air-tight states of the air lines for the 
controlled tamper events in the test programme were indicative with respect to the conditions 
surrounding potential tamper events in the field.  Any tamper measure needed to address 
these. 
Fast Fourier transforms (FFTs) were applied to the dynamic air pressure transducer (APT) 
data shown Figure 5.  Examples of these FFT plots are shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.  Example of FFTs for APT tampering events (LHS is flat line). 
 
Rectangular FFT windowing was used (Brigham 1988) to analyse the 1248 data points 
recorded at 41.6 Hz for each dynamic recording.  The vertical scales used in Figure 6 are 
arbitrary linear scales but are of the same units. 
The frequency spectra of the air springs when tampering occurred had some distinct and 
common characteristics, namely: 
• a smooth transition from maxima at the lower end of the frequency spectrum to 
minima at the upper end; and 
• no distinct peaks in the frequency spectrum from physical or mechanical 
influences on the HV air springs save for a maximum amplitude at the lower end 
of the spectrum. 
The FFTs did not alter markedly in their overall shapes or characteristics for the leaky tamper 
events compared with the non-leaky ones.  These FFT results were very likely due to the 
absence of dynamic signals at the APTs that would be expected at the air springs.  As 
mentioned, these dynamic signals would be from a combination of sources such as road 
surface signals, pitch modes, HV Eigenfrequencies (OECD 1998), etc.  This combination of 
signals was not evident in any of the FFT outputs from any of the tamper tests.  Previous 
analysis arrived at a similar conclusion (Davis et al. 2009). 
5. Tamper indicators 
Transport industry regulators in Australia would welcome an operational environment where 
tampering with HV systems did not occur.  However, should OBM systems be implemented 
in a regulatory framework in future, transport industry regulators take the pragmatic view that 
attempts at tampering will occur.  That such a framework is being considered more widely is 
evident (Clarke and Prentice 2009).  Accordingly, reliable tamper-evident metrics are required 
to indicate tamper events. 
 
To detect tampering events, a number of quantitative tampering measures have been 
developed.  This paper provides only the results for one such measure, designated the 
‘tampering index’ (TIX).  Other tampering metrics are being developed by TCA and the 
Department of Transport and Main Roads.  As is proper, details of these are being kept 
confidential so that they are not undermined by unscrupulous activity such as reverse 
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engineering being applied to them.  Accordingly, a general description of the TIX algorithm 
and the results of its application are made public here, but specific details are restricted. 
The tampering index (TIX) is a non-dimensional number and is proposed as one of a range of 
indicators to be applied to OBM data.  These indicators are anticipated as triggers to notify 
jurisdictions of potential tamper events. 
 
The TIX indicator was derived from the range of dynamic data from the OBM system primary 
transducers.  Were the load or the speed to increase, then the range of the dynamic data would 
be expected to increase as shown in other work in this project (Davis and Bunker 2008).  
Accordingly, the TIX algorithm normalises the data’s dynamic range so that the TIX values 
remain within a reasonably constant envelope, irrespective of speed or load.  Applying the 
TIX algorithm to the dynamic data for the non-tamper circuits resulted in a range of values 
that were indicative of “healthy” operation, i.e. no tampering.  Figure 7 shows a graphical 
representation of this concept by example. 
 
Figure 7 – Illustrative plot showing TIX range for dynamic data during typical 
operation and TIX value during tamper event. 
 
The “healthy” range for TIX values is arrowed and between the upper and lower TIX results.  
In this figure, the TIX tamper value is the lower square.  Where the derived TIX values 
resulted in loci, rather than points of maxima and minima, the healthy range for the TIX 
values was bounded by those loci.  The TIX algorithm was applied to the dynamic data 
recorded during the test circuits for both the tamper and non-tamper test states.  This was to 
provide TIX values for control data when the HVs were moving without tampering vs. test 
TIX values derived from the test data cases for tamper events.  Thirty-eight instances of 
tamper vs. non-tamper events were analysed using the TIX algorithm.  Three indicative 
examples for this analysis are plotted in Figure 8 below. 
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Figure 8 – Annotated example of TIX algorithm applied to empirical on-board mass 
data for typical operation and during tamper event. 
 
In all thirty-eight cases, the TIX values for tamper tests were distinct from TIX ranges or areas 
between the loci for maxima and minima from the non-tamper data (Davis et al. 2009). 
 
The TIX algorithm was also applied to data collected from air springs during other testing 
(Davis and Bunker 2008) that incorporated a range of speeds from urban to highway.  The 
order-of-magnitude of these TIX results remained constant for that range of speeds.  This 
validated the concept of the inclusion of a normalising factor in the TIX algorithm. 
6. Discussion 
6.1 Tamper metrics - implementation 
The following logical chain of scenarios derived from the testing in this project may inform 
Stage 2 of the IAP for implementation of OBM systems on HVs.  Given any normal 
operational scenario for a monitored HV, a number of metrics would be expected to be 
present, including: 
movement of the vehicle  (detected via GPS tracking capability); 
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frequency spectrum of the dynamic data being characterised as: 
not smooth; 
not declining in magnitude with increasing frequency; 
with multiple peaks and all of them above (say) 1.0 Hz; and 
tamper index (TIX) within healthy bounds. 
 
Were scenarios 1 to 3 (and hence their associated metrics) to be present, then tampering is 
highly improbable.  Some OBM systems have an accelerometer built into their housing.  
These elements are used by manufacturers to compensate the OBM reading when the HV is 
parked on a slope.  Other applications of accelerometers in OBM modules are used to 
determine if the HV is on level ground.  Both these applications of accelerometers to OBM 
readings allow the HV operator to make a judgement of the reliability of the OBM readout 
accuracy or, in more advanced applications, allow the OBM system to correct the raw 
transducer data before displaying a mass value (Davis 2008). 
 
Further to scenarios 1 to 3 above, then, another indicator may be added: 
7. dynamic signals from the chassis of the vehicle as it is in motion and as 
measured by an accelerometer in the OBM unit. 
 
Were a combination of scenario 1, above, to be present without scenarios 2 to 4, it is highly 
likely that tampering has occurred.  Other combinations, such as where all or part of scenario 
2 or scenario 3 are not present individually but scenario 4 is detected, would indicate a high 
probability that a tamper event had occurred. 
 
Even for basic implementation of tamper-evidence without the multiple verifications of 
scenarios 1 to 4 (and their associated metrics) above, the simple metrics of: 
movement of the vehicle, as detected by GPS; 
dynamic data being present at the chassis; and 
absence of primary transducer signal (due to blocked air line or cables cut); 
would be a basic set of conditions that would indicate a high probability of a tamper event. 
6.2 Future research 
The main areas of potential tampering with APTs have been addressed in the test programme 
and development of both technical and business options to detect these events will need to be 
addressed for implementation of regulatory OBM system application to Australian HVs.  The 
issue of applying the TIX algorithm developed to detect tampering to load cell data needs to 
be undertaken.  This is because HVs use load cells as well as APTs to determine OBM 
readings.  The issue of tampering with load cells in the static environment has been shown to 
be of concern (Karl et al. 2009).  The TIX algorithm has not yet been validated against 
corrupted vs. typical load cell data.  A modified OBM reference system will need to be used to 
measure dynamic signals from load cells, before and after they have been wedged, to explore 
further the validity of the tampering algorithms and any supporting technical and business 
rules developed. 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper has presented typical air pressure transducer tamper data from the heavy vehicle 
OBM testing programme conducted by Transport Certification Australia (TCA).  It has 
expanded on data analysis of the deliberate tampering events during the OBM system testing.  
A set of tamper indicators was developed and included an algorithm to indicate a tamper 
event.  These indicators and the algorithm have been presented, with some validation.  These 
developments will inform road transport regulators and jurisdictions in the implementation of 
OBM systems for heavy vehicles (HVs) and may be used for Stage 2 of the Intelligent Access 
Project.  The main areas of potential tampering have now been addressed and development of 
both technical and business options to detect these events will need to be addressed for 
implementation of regulatory OBM system application to Australian HVs.  Agreed best 
practice guidelines and procedures for installation, calibration, operation and maintenance, 
will be developed as TCA moves into the regulatory phase for OBM implementation.  The test 
programme investigated the potential use of additional intelligence derived from analysis of 
dynamic OBM data as validation against data from the static data recorded by those OBM 
systems. 
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